Critical Remarks on Some Business Cycle Theories by Tinbergen, J. (Jan)
Critical Remarks on Some Business-Cycle Theories
J. Tinbergen
Econometrica, Vol. 10, No. 2. (Apr., 1942), pp. 129-146.
Stable URL:
http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0012-9682%28194204%2910%3A2%3C129%3ACROSBT%3E2.0.CO%3B2-0
Econometrica is currently published by The Econometric Society.
Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use, available at
http://www.jstor.org/about/terms.html. JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use provides, in part, that unless you have obtained
prior permission, you may not download an entire issue of a journal or multiple copies of articles, and you may use content in
the JSTOR archive only for your personal, non-commercial use.
Please contact the publisher regarding any further use of this work. Publisher contact information may be obtained at
http://www.jstor.org/journals/econosoc.html.
Each copy of any part of a JSTOR transmission must contain the same copyright notice that appears on the screen or printed
page of such transmission.
JSTOR is an independent not-for-profit organization dedicated to and preserving a digital archive of scholarly journals. For
more information regarding JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.
http://www.jstor.org
Wed May 2 08:17:36 2007
CRITICAL REhlARKS ON SOME 

BUSINESS-CYCLE THEORIES 

A. INTRODUCTORY 
IN  PREVIOUS INVESTIGATIONS' we have attempted, with the help of 
statistical methods, to contribute to the explanation of cyclical fluctua- 
tions in modern free-enterprise economies, viz., the United States and 
Holland, 1921-1932. The experience gathered has since been increased 
by a yet unpublished study of the same type of the British economy in 
the period 1870-1914. In  the present paper we propose to consider 
critically some of the best-known business-cycle theories in the light 
of the results of these investigations. We shall not base our observations 
solely on statistical arguments, however, but also make use, where that 
seems appropriate, of other considerations. 
We do not claim to have proved, when constructing our models of 
the American, English, and Dutch economies, all features laid down in 
these models to be inevitable. We have presented these models as pos- 
sible structures, perhaps even as probable structures, which have the 
advantage that they are a t  least not contradictory to the statistics 
used in their construction. Hence, not all our conclusions on some busi- 
ness-cycle theories can actually be proved. Nevertheless we think that 
our attempts lead to useful suggestions and it is hoped that those who 
reject our conclusions will a t  least try to give alternative attempts to 
explain the real course of the crucial variables in a way similar to ours. 
The ultimate scope of a paper like the present ~vould be that we could 
state for any theory: i. whether or not it is in accordance with the facts, 
and ii. if it were true, to what extent i t  explains the course of events. 
The decision that a theory is true (cf. point i above) can only be taken 
on the basis of economic arguments, but provided that the statistician 
has found it not to be contradictory to the facts. That  decision once 
taken, the statistician may again take over the job and tell (cf. point 
ii above) to what extent it influences the course of events. 
Ifre shall not, however, be able to proceed in accordance with this 
ideal. As far as possible we shall try to approach it. 
As a rule, a theory contains two sorts of statements, first, statements 
on elementary eqaations, and secondly, statements on the combined 
effect of elementary equations. Statements on elementary equations 
deal with the direct causes of the fluctuations in one of the economic 
1 J. Tinbergen, Business Cycles in the United States, 1919-1932, Geneva, 
League of Nations, 1939, to  be quoted as U.S. ;  and A n  Econometric Approach 
to Business Cycle Problerns (relating to Holland), Paris, Hermann, 1937, to  be 
quoted as Holl. 
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phenomena of the mechanism. Statements on the combined effect of 
more than one elementary equation relate to the indirect causes and, 
when going far enough, give an insight into the general process of move- 
ment of the system. The elementary equations are the elements upon 
which all further deduction has to be built. 
When reviewing, in the following sections, some theories, we shall, 
for each important statement on some elementary equation made by 
that theory, try to 
(a) indicate whether or not any direct cause, mentioned by that 
theory, has been included in our calculations; 
(b) if not, give the reasons why it was not included; 
(c) if included, state whether or not we found it  to be important. 
Some scattered remarks on the combined effect of the elementary 
relations will be added. In some cases an immediate testing of the state- 
ments made by some theories is possible. 
B. MONETARY OVERINVESTMENT THEORIES 
Haberler2 considers as the characteristic feature of all overinvestment 
theories that they stress the fact of the overdevelopment, during the 
boom, of investment-goods industries as compared with consumers'- 
goods industries. I t  may already be observed a t  the start that this fact 
may best be illustrated by the relative amplitudes of the production 
curves for both types of industries, i.e., by the amplitudes expressed as 
a percentage of trend values. I t  is not true, as is sometimes thought, 
that the absolute fluctuations in the volume or the value of production 
are larger for investment-goods industries than for consumers'-goods 
industries.3 
The group of overinvestment theories is subdivided by Haberler into 
three groups, viz., (a) monetary theories, (b) nonmonetary theories, 
and (c) theories using the acceleration principle. According to  group 
(a), the business cycle is not a purely monetary phenomenon, but some 
authors consider monetary forces as the impe l l ing  factor (the disturbing 
shock in our words), others believe that certain monetary arrange- 
ments are conditioning factors.' In  this section we shall consider the 
relations and conclusions put forward by the theories of group (a). 
1. An elastic money  supp l y  is assumed to exist.5 This is confirmed by 
Prosperity and Depression, New revised and enlarged edition, Geneva, League 
of Nations, 1939, Ch. 3. 
a For the U. S. we find, e.g., that  the value of production of consumersJ goods 
falls from 1929 to 1932 by $30,000 million, the value of production of investment 
goods by 815,000 millions (U.S. , p. 206). For the U.K. the standard deviations 
from trend are £50 and £20 millions respectively. 
Haberler, op. cit.,p. 31. 
Ibid., p. 33. 
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our results for the United Kingdom where we found the supply of bank 
notes to be fairly elastic and that  of bank deposits to be very elastic. 
For the United States the elasticity of supply is found to be 0.65.6It is 
interesting to note that  if the money supply were completely elastic, 
this ~vould mean that  the other (nonmonetary) factors were allowed to 
work out completely, without being hindered in any way by the 
monetary system. Thus, in a sense, a complete elasticity of the money 
supply means that  the shape and length, etc., of the cycles depend only 
on nonmonetary factors and in this sense are a nonmonetary phenom- 
enon. On the other hand, this complete elasticity of the money supply 
means that the monetary condition is fulfilled for the free development 
of the cycle. Some authors seem to base their statement tha t  "cycles 
are a monetary phenomenon" on this consideration. Thus there seems 
to be some confusion as to the exact meaning of a "monetary phe- 
nomenon" and it seems better to speak in such concrete terms as "high 
elasticity of money supply," etc. 
2. Aluch importance is attached to the distinction of market rate of 
interest and natural rate of interest; the demand for investable funds is 
assumed to depend on the difference between market rate and natural 
rate.7 Thc market rate is assumed to be influenced more or less deliber- 
:~tely by the banking authorities. The follo~ving comments may be 
given : 
(a) The concept of natural rate is not so clear as most theorists sug- 
gest to us. Usually it is introduced as the interest rate that would equate 
demand for investable funds and supply of savings, credit creation 
being excluded. At closer inspection this is not so unambiguous as i t  
seems to be. Clearly i t  is a hypothetical rate; hence i t  depends on the 
assumptions made. I t  must not be overlooked that  both the demand 
for investable funds and the supply of savings may depend, directly 
or indirectly, on the rate of interest. That  they may depend directly 
on it will be clear. They also depend indirectly on it, for the simple 
reason that all economic phenomena are interrelated. If the supposed 
equilibrium between demand for investable funds and savings should 
be realized, the interest rate would change and this would also change 
the demand and the savings. A perfect equilibrium would be obtained 
only if all indirect influences of the new interest rate should also have 
worked out; more or less provisional equilibria would be conceivable if 
not all indircct influences should have worked out yet. Now there may 
be made all sorts of hypotheses on whether or not the various indirect 
This may he calculated from U.S., page 88, where it  is found that  d~l i l /dm,  
=6.6. According to the tables on p. 205 the average value for &I is 47.8 and for 
m, is 4.7. It follo~vsthat  the elasticity is 0.65. 
Haberler, op. cit., p. 34. 
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influences of the change in interest rate have to be included or not in 
the concept of natural 
(b) If it is already uncertain what the exact definition of the natural 
rate should be, then its statistical measurement is still more uncertain 
and it is not very probable that entrepreneurs would base their invest- 
ment plans on it. Sometimes it is identified with the current profit rate. 
I t  would be difficult to  prove that  this idcntification is in accordance 
with one of the possible definitions, unless a number of simplifying as- 
sumptions be introduced. But there is a good deal of common sense in 
the assumptions that (i) investment activity depends on the difference 
between expected profit rate and market rate of interest and (ii) the 
expectcd profit rate goes up and down parallel with the current profit 
rate. 
(c) Our resultsg show that a reasonable degree of accordance with the 
facts can be obtained if profits, the interest rate, and the price of in- 
vestment goods are assumed to be the factors determining investment 
activity. The reason why the price of investment goods is also intro- 
duced has been set out in previous work of the author.lo Figures for 
profit rates are not available, but similar calculations have been made 
for the period 1919-1936 and for Germany, 1870-1912, where figures 
for profit rates were available. In  these cases i t  was found that, in fact, 
the regression coefficients found for profit rates and interest rates were 
about equal and of opposite sign, meaning that  it is by the difference 
between both rates that they influence investment activity.ll At the 
same time all calculations mentioned show that the fluctuations in 
profits are, by their greater amplitude, much more responsible for the 
investment fluctuations than those in the market interest rate. Our 
rcsults would therefore suggest that  an explanation of the fluctuations 
in investment activity must emphasize much more the fluctuations in 
natural rates-as far as those may be identified with profit rates-than 
those in market rates, as is also suggested by Haberler. 
(d) This conclusion is the more acceptable, since it is questionable 
n hether market interest rates are, to such a large extent as some theo- 
rists would make us believe, dependent on deliberate action of the 
bankers. Mr. Hawtrey's thesis that  they are largely determined on the 
basis of the gold stock and its probable changes is in conflict with this 
view; and our calculations do not challenge Mr. Hawtrey's opinion. 
Both for the United States and the United Kingdom the fluctuations 
The clearest discussion on this matter is found, as far as I know, in Professor 
Frisch's mimeographed lectures. 
* -4 Method a n d  I t s  App l i c a t i on  to  Inves tmen t  Ac t i v i t y ,  Geneva, 1939. 
l o  Ih id . ,  p. 36. 
l1 Ih id . ,  p. 66. 
in the short-term rate of interest can be well explained by the fluctua- 
tions in gold stock of the central banks. For the case of the United 
Kingdom account has to be taken of some supplementary factors relat- 
ing to the tension in the balance of payments. Quite generally the wcll- 
known fact that interest rates move closely parallel to  the general cycle 
and somewhat lagged12 is an additional argument against the view that 
deliberate action of the banks determines them. 
3. Low interest rates are assumed to stimulate invcstment activity, 
incomes, and prices. All this does not conflict with our statistical re- 
sults; thc influence on invcstment activity has been mentioned already. 
The influence of investment activity on incomes is generally recognized 
and also reflected in our and so is the influence of activity on 
prices.'"t should not be forgotten, however, that, if the explanation 
given of investment activity is correct, the influence of interest rates 
on investment activity is rather small and hence also the indirect influ- 
ence on the other phenomena. 
4. As a counterpart to the influence of interest rates on prices, the 
influence of rising prices on interest rates is stressed by pointing to the 
advantages obtainable by commodity speculation.15 By our method, a 
clear direct influence of the rate of increase in prices on the dcmand for 
goods could not be discerned. Two attempts have been made. The rate 
of incrcase in priccs of investment goods was included as one of the 
explanatory variables in the explanation of investment activity.16 I t  
turned out to have a weak influence only. In the "explanation" of con- 
sumption outlay for the United Kingdom both p (cost of living) and 
p-1 (coht of living, one year before) were included and the latter got a 
very small regression coefficient. If an influence of the rate of increase, 
p-p-I, had been present, p-l ought to have obtained a large negative 
coefficient. So a direct influence of the rate of increase in prices on the 
dcmand for goods could not be discerned. Of course such statements 
always depend on what other variables have been included in the corre- 
lation analysis; these other variables, however, do seem to have been 
chosen reasonably. 
An indirect influence of the rate of increase in prices was, however, 
found, a t  least for the United Kingdom and Holland, since incomes 
themselrcs could be "explained" satisfactorily only if they were as- 
l2  This fact has led to the construction of the C-rurve of the Harvard barome- 
ter, ~vhiph, as the reader knows, was based primarily on observation without a 
particular theoretical background. 
l3 U.Q . ,eq. (5. 10);Holl., Ch. I ,  G. 
l4 U.S., Ch. 111; Holl., p. 16. 
l6 Haberler, op. cit., p. 37. 
'Tinbergen,  A llfethod . . . , pp. 51 ff. 
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sunled to depend on the rate of increase in prices.'? This represents the 
fact that "paper profits" on commodity stocks are included in profits 
calculations. Since profits influence, in their turn, the demand for both 
consumers' goods and investment goods, there \vould exist an indirect 
influence of the rate of increase in prices on the demand for goods and 
hence for credits. The demand for credits influences the interest rate. 
Thus there would be, also according to our scheme, an influence of the 
rate of increase in prices on the interest rate. 
5 .  Considerable importance is attached, by the theories under dis- 
cussion, to the changes i n  the real sphere as a consequence of an increased 
investment activity.18 I t  is held that  by the fall in the rate of interest 
the roundabout may of production is lengthened, which means a rela- 
tive increase in the production of investment goods as compared with 
consumers' goods. Before commenting from the statistical side, we have 
to make some observations from a theoretical viewpoint. The length 
of the roundabout way can be determined only for a state of equilib- 
rium. It may then, in our models, be represented by the ratio of the 
production of investment goods to that  of consumers' goods; but the 
production of investment goods has to represent the production that  is 
actually necessary and sufficient for the maintenance of the level of 
production of consumers' goods a t  a given level. If, however, the pro- 
duction of consumers' goods is not constant through time, the quantity 
of investment goods necessary for that  production is not constant either 
and the annual replacement production of investment goods may fluc- 
tuate in a still different way. Year-to-year changes in the ratio need not 
have anything to do with changes i n  the roundabout way. This conclusion 
is reinforced by the existence of new investment, which may fluctuate 
because of exaggerated expectations. Thus i t  can hardly be proved 
from the facts whether or not the roundabout way of production for 
any given product shows cyclic movements. On the other hand, the 
fluctuations in the ratio may well be explained by other and simpler 
relationships, viz., the fact that profit fluctuations have a larger infiu- 
ence on the demand for investment goods than on the demand for 
consumers1 goods. 
There are also some a priori reasons to suppose that  the changes in 
roundabout way of production during the cycle are only faint. Because 
of the long lifetime of most investment goods, only a relatively small 
part of them can be replaced, during any one year, by other types, in 
accordance with the prcvailing rate of interest. Although, therefore, the 
l7 For the U.S. this could not be discerned; perhaps since in tha t  case the fluc- 
tuations in volume of production were more important than in the other cases. 
Thus the price changes did not take such an  important place in the fluctuations 
in profits as in the case of the U.K. 
IIaberler, op. cit., p. 39. 
statement of the cyclic fluctuations in the roundabout way cannot be 
tested statistically with the material a t  hand, there are good reasons to 
neglect this phenomenon altogether. 
This does not mean, as we said already, that the ratio between the 
production of investment goods and that of consumers' goods does not 
change. I t  certainly fluctuates during the cycle; it is high in boom 
periods and low in depressions. The two production series hardly show, 
howevcr, as is sometimes thought, a lag.19 Both series are, in our equa- 
tions, regulated chiefly by the fluctuations in profits; the production of 
consumers' goods is connected with them by the marginal propensity 
to consume and the production of investment goods by a coefficient 
that similarly could be called the marginal propensity to invest. The  
relative magnitude of these two coeficients appears to be such that the 
resulting jtuctuations i n  investment activity are, on  a percentage basis, 
larger than those in the production of consumers' goods. I t  does not seem 
satisfactory to end our interpretation a t  this point, since various auth- 
ors in this field try to explain this relative magnitude. One explanation 
is that of the acceleration principle, to  which we shall pay attention 
afterwards. For long-run changes this is certainly right-it is almost a 
tautology-but for short-run changes i t  appears not to be true.20 An- 
other explanation is the Keynesian, where the propensity to invest is 
identified with the propensity to save, by the neglect of a lag (which 
may be short) and the ratio between the two production series is, there- 
fore, chir$y determined by the level of the marginal propensity to consume. 
Our own attitude is largely affirmative to Mr. Keynes' view, with a 
slight reservation for thc neglect of the lag and for the possibility of 
investing abroad. This latter point is not in conflict with Mr. Keynes' 
theory, hut with an application to an open country. 
6. The proximate causes for the downturn.21 Before considering the 
particular causes of the downturn, we may repeat a general statement 
of, in our opinion, primordial importance to the questions now under 
discussion. The question whether or not a downturn will occur is a 
quantitative question. With the same qualitative connections between 
the phenomena studied, a downturn may inevitably develop in the 
case of one set of coefficients and inevitably not develop with another 
set of coefficients. These questions cannot be understood without a 
quantitative study of the connection^.^^ 
l9 Cf. also my "Suggestions on Quantitative Business Cycle Theory," E c o ~ o -  
METRICA, Vol. 3, 1935, p. 241, in particular pp. 253-254, and "Consumptiegoe- 
deren en productiemiddelen," De Nederlandsche Conjunctuur, December, 1933, 
p. 17. 
20  Cf. Section 4. 
21 Haherler, op. cit., Ch. 111, 4, pp. 45-57. 
2% I gave an example in my paper "Econometric Business Cycle Research," 
Review of Economic Studies, Vol. 7, 1940, p. 83. 
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(a) Coming to the proximate causes of the downturn as seen by the 
theories under discussion, Haberler mentions, first of all,23 the inability 
or unwillingness of the banking system to continue the expansion. -4s far 
as the banks show this inability by an increase in interest rates, it is 
included in our equation determining the interest rate. As far as an 
additional action of the banks, in particular by rationing credits, is 
meant, this would have to show itself in our equations on investment 
activity or on demand for credits by a deviation between actual and 
calculated series, especially a t  the top of the boom. The actual figures 
of, e.g., investment activity ought to be lower, by this rationing, than 
the calculated figures, where no account is taken of this influence. The 
same ought to be true for the amount of credit demanded. Something 
of this kind cannot, however, be discerned in the corresponding 
graphs.24 This is no straightforward proof of the absence of rationing, 
but a suggestion that it has perhaps not had much importance. 
(b) Professor Hayek attaches much importance to a relative shift 
from investment to consumption in the later phases of the cycle. A 
comparison of the curves for consumption outlay and home-investment 
outlay for the United Kingdom does not show a regular behavior of 
this kind. In  1891 and 1908 there is, in fact, a high consumption outlay 
in comparison to investment, but in 1874, 1884, and 1901 there is noth- 
ing of this kind. The course of these two variables for the United States 
during the period 1919-193225 is about exactly parallel, showing no shift 
of the sort. The same is true for the Dutch figures in this period. Pro- 
fessor Hayek bases his statement on the fact, confirmed by our statis- 
tics, that total wages lag behind profits. There seems to be, however, 
the counteracting fact that consumption outlay by nonworkers shows 
a definite lag behind incomes. For the United States the reason of this 
lag appears to be the lag between profits and income paid out.26 
(c) As another factor that tends to swell the demand for consumers' 
goods, Haberler mentions2' faulty bookkeeping methods, leading to paper 
profits. The presence of these is, for the United Kingdom and Holland, 
confirmed by our results; but i t  is another matter whether they tend to 
swell consumption towards the end of the boom. This would be true only 
if prices should rise very fast only a t  the end of the boom and not be- 
fore; the figures do not confirm this hypothesis. I t  is, in fact, true for 
some minerals in some boom periods; but i t  is not true for the bulk of 
raw materials. I t  is still another question whether or not the phenome- 
2 3  IIaberler, op. cit., p. 47. 

24 U.Ls.' p. 47. 

26 Cf. U.iS., p. 208: U' and I-'. 

26  Zbid.,  p. 208 curves Z and EE. 

27 IIaberler, op. ci t . ,  p. 49. 

non of paper profits is a reason for the turning point to come. They 
arc proportional to the rate of increase in prices, and, since prices move 
largely parallel to the general cycle, to the rate of increase in profits. 
The rate of increase has the tendency to show fluctuations preceding the 
fluctuations of profits themselves: the maximum rate of increase in a 
cyclic curve is attained before the maximum of the curve itself, since 
a t  that maximum the rate of increase is zero again. The paper profit ele- 
ment in profits therefore is already beginning to decline when the other 
elements are still rising and thus they are an early depressing tendency. 
hlathematically this works in exactly the same way as the acceleration 
principlc. 
7. Thc upturn.  As an important reason for a revival Haberler men- 
tionsZ8 the possibility that the natural rate of interest a t  once rises 
above the market rate, especially if the fall of prices comes to an end. 
This is in good accordance with our system, since a stop to the price 
fall means an increase in the rate of increase in prices, and this influ- 
ences profit calculations favorably. 
Summarizing, our impression of the monetary ovcrinvcstment theories 
is that their central statement that  the difference between natural and 
market rate of interest regulates investment activity-if interpreted 
as we did-is reflected in our models. The emphasis laid on the market 
rate of interest seems to be somewhat exaggerated, the influence of 
changes in the natural rate underestimated. The thesis that market 
rates are changed deliberately is open to doubt, and so are the state- 
ments about credit rationing and about a shift towards consumption 
a t  the end of the boom. 
C. NONMONETARY OVERINVESTMEIXT THEORIES 
Following Haberlcr, we shall first discuss the theories of Spiethoff 
and C a s ~ e l . ~ ~  
1. The fact, mentioned by Spiethoff, that  sometimes consumption 
has fallen during an upswing, must not be taken too seriously as a proof 
that an increased investment activity is the necessary condition of an 
upturn. Consumption is, more than investment activity, influenced by 
crop yields, which show irregular fluctuations. I t  does not follow that 
the systematic forces making for consumption are not very important 
for the causation of the cycle. 
A similar remark may be made with respect to the further argument 
that fluctuations in investment activity precede consumption fluctua- 
tions and therefore must be the "cause" of the cycle. Apart from the 
Ibid., p. 62. 

?"bid., pp. 72-85. 
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doubt whether this lag actually exists,30 i t  has already been observed by 
the authors advocating the acceleration principle that investment ac- 
tivity still may be the consequence of the rate of increase of consump- 
tion, since the cycles in that rate of increase precede the cycles in in- 
vestment activity. 
2. Spiethoff also holds the theory that saving falls off a t  the end of 
the boom because of a rise in wages. We have already dealt with this 
matter in the preceding section, under 6b. He attaches more impor- 
tance, however, to the overproduction of fixed capital goods. This over- 
production in a sense is also an element of our scheme. Overproduction 
means a larger production than can be used economically. If there were 
no lag between orders and deliveries of capital goods, then an overpro- 
duction would not be possible: If there were no economic use for the 
goods, why order them? I t  is only since a t  the moment of ordering the 
market position is better than at  the moment of delivery that  overpro- 
duction can take place. This state of affairs is well described by Afta- 
lion31 in the parallel with the stove. In our scheme, the lag between 
ordering and delivery of capital goods is discounted in the lag between 
profits and consumption of investment goods.32 
3. For the explanation of the upturn, Spiethoff points to new inven- 
tions and the discovery or opening of new markets. These phenomena 
are considered as external "disturbances," giving fresh impulses to the 
business system. The fact that Spiethoff does not hope much from 
automatic revival means, in our language, that he considers the damp- 
ing degree of the systematic movements as rather large. Our results 
would suggest that he is somewhat too pessimistic in this respect. 
4. At some places in his writings, Professor Spiethoff makes allusion 
to another possible cause of revival, viz., the so-called reinvestment or 
echo phenomenon. For reasons to be set out elsewhere we are also of 
the opinion that this phenomenon must play a certain role.33 
5. There remains to be discussed, in this section, the acceleration 
principle. In  its rough form the principle says that the quantity of in- 
vestment goods required is proportional to the rate of increase in the 
production of consumers' goods. I t  is used in particular to demonstrate 
that the percentage fluctuations in investment-goods production are 
much larger than those in consumers'-goods production. A number of 
30 Cf. Section B, 5. 
31 I t  is to  be doubted whether Aftalion should be reckoned-as he is by 
IIaberler-among the theorists of the acceleration principle. 
32 U.S.,  p. 45. 
33 A recent contribution to a statistical proof of this phenomenon is given by 
J. Meuldijk, "Der Englische Schiffbau wahrend der Periode 1870-1912 und das 
Problem des Ersatzbaues," Weltwirtschaftlichss Archiv, Vol. 52, 1940, p. 524. 
qualifications have to be made. The principle is deduced from the hypoth- 
esis that production is always a t  full capacity; i t  then describes how 
capacity has to be adapted to demand for consumers' goods, which is 
considered as given. Apart from the impossibility of adapting capacity 
to rapidly falling volumes of production, there is the statistical fact 
that production is not always a t  full capacity, even in boom periods. 
Taken rigorously, the principle would imply a lead, by about one- 
quarter of a cycle, of investment-goods production ahead of consumers1- 
goods production. Such a lead does not exist; moreover, the time shape 
of the curve of investment-goods production deviates considerably 
from the time shape of the curve representing the rate of increase in 
consumers1-goods production. Finally, the amplitude of these curves 
does not show the proportion required by the principle: the amplitude 
of investment-goods production is about one-half or less of what is 
required.34 
Since the principle has sometimes been considered almost a tautol- 
ogy, the above conclusions need some further comment. In  the long 
run i t  is probable indeed that  the principle is satisfied. The short-run 
fluctuations in investment-goods production must be considered, how- 
ever, only as attempts to regulate capacity. The ideal of this regulation 
may be the adaptation as set out by the acceleration principle. But  
since the adaptation must always be directed towards an unknown fu- 
ture demand for consumers' goods, i t  is only natural that  errors may be 
committed. The entrepreneurs have to make some hypothesis about 
future development; that  they base themselves on the actual situation 
of incomes and become more optimistic the higher these incomes, seems 
also quite conceivable. This, in fact, is the assumption made for the 
establishment of our "investment equation,"35 which gives a much bet- 
ter fit than the acceleration principle. 
If this view be accepted, the relative amplitude of the cyclic fluctua- 
tions in consumption-goods and investment-goods production must be 
explained otherwise, the more so since the proportion actually deviates 
from what the theory would require. We have tried to give another 
explanation in the previous section (under 5). I ts  chief element is some- 
thing quite near to Mr. Keynes' multiplier concept, based on the pro- 
pensities to consume and invest. We think this is more appropriate for 
the cyclic fluctuations. 
I n  summary, our results suggest that  neither investment activity 
nor consumption is leading, but that  both depend on profit calculations: 
34 All this has been set out in my paper, "Statistical Evidence on the Accelera- 
tion Principle," Econom i ca ,  Vol. 5, 1938, p. 164; cf. also A Method  a n d  i t s  A p p l i -  
cat ion to  Inves tmen t  Ac t i v i t y ,  pp. 50-55. 
35 U.S., p. 45; cf. also, A Method  a n d  i t s  A p p l i c a t i o n  to  Inves tmen t  Ac t i v i t y .  
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investment activity, since it is based on profit expectations and finan- 
cial possibilities, which both depend on profit calculations; consump- 
tion, since i t  is based on disposable income, which also depends on 
profit calculations. Investment activity as well as consumption are 
lagging about one year behind calculated profits. Calculated profits are 
based not only on current production and prices, but also on the rate 
of increase in prices, whose cycles precede those of prices. Both con- 
sumption and investment activity are also dependent on random fluc- 
tuations: consumption on crop yields and investment activity on inven- 
tions. Such random disturbances may, together with the consequences 
of the echo principle, stimulate the cycle again after i t  has been damp- 
ing down. 
D. 	CHAiXGES I N  COST, HORIZONTAL MALADJUSTMENTS, 
AiXD OVERINDEBTEDNESS 
1. Changes in cost are reflected in our models in the price eq~ations.~B 
In particular those relating to home prices tell us that marginal cost 
and hence prices rise if the volume of production goes up. In their turn, 
these higher prices reduce the quantity demanded of the corresponding 
goods.37 I t  does not follow, however, that they also reduce the value of 
demand. The elasticity of demand is below unity for each of these cate- 
gories and therefore total value is not diminishing as a consequence of a 
rise in costs. For this reason we agree with Haberler when he does not 
attach much importance to cost changes for an explanation of cycles. 
2. Horizontal maladjustments have not been given a prominent 
place in our system of relations. The reason is that not very much evi- 
dence is available for serious horizontal maladjustments. As a rule all 
branches-industries of food products as well as clothing and durable 
goods, e.g.--show the cycles in a similar way. Shifts from one good to 
another occur either as a consequence of a long-term process of replace- 
ment (cotton by artificial silk) or as a consequence of random crop 
fluctuations (year-to-year changes in cotton consumption), which both 
have not very much to do with systematic cyclical changes. 
3. Overindebtedness also has no place in our scheme. One reason is 
that total (long-term) debts of industry, as far as they have been 
measured statistically, do not seem to have changed very violently. 
Now such rapid fluctuations as business cycles can only be explained 
by the interaction of rapidly changing phenomena. Slowly changing 
variables can only have a certain significance as conditioning factors, 
not as direct causes. 
Another reason for not having represented by one of our equations 
36 U.i5'., Ch. 111; Holl., Section I ,  C.  

37 U.S., Ch. 11;Holl., pp. 23 and 31. 

the particular mechanism meant by Professor Fisher we may present in 
the following way: The mechanism through which high debts tend to 
provoke a crisis is that of distress selling. In  the language of our rela- 
tions this would mean that some of the price equations should show 
deviations particularly in crisis periods. Actual prices should be sys- 
tematically lower than calculated prices in times of crises, pointing to a 
tendency of underbidding the market more than usually. No systematic 
feature of this kind could be detected. Again we do not pretend to have 
proved that nothing of this kind exists; but we suggest that it was not 
of much importance, a t  least in the periods and countries studied and 
for the economies as a whole. 
E. UNDERCONSUMPTION THEORIES 
1. Professor Haberler, in his chapter on these theories, rightly begins 
by rejecting a number of formulations of these theories that deal only 
with secular phenomena. "It is hopeless," he says, "to explain the busi- 
ness cycle without taking account of the cumulative nature of the 
'short-run' processes of expansion and con t r a c t i ~n . "~~  toWe want 
stress this also with respect to other theories using secular changes to 
explain cycles, e.g., theories that explain revival by pointing to popula- 
tion 
As the heart of the "underconsumption theory" Haberler considers 
the statement that an increase in savings means a reduction of the 
demand for consumers' goods and an increase in investment, and hence, 
in the supply of consumers' goods. Therefore, the adherents of this 
theory say, only a decrease in savings will be favorable to the general 
busincss situation and may postpone the crisis. 
Haberler seems to admit that this theory is possible; but he very 
much stresses, on the other hand, the possibility seen by the overinvest- 
ment theories, viz., that more savings are necessary as a consequence of 
an increased roundabout way of production. In  this train of thought, 
higher savings are necessary a t  the moment of the crisis, since other- 
wise a part of the newly ordered investment goods (necessary, inter alia, 
because of the longer roundabout way) could not be "taken over" and 
production in these stages would have to be stopped. At the same time 
it would not matter if less were available for consumption, since pro- 
duction of consumers' goods is decreased: workers from these branches 
38 Haberler, op. cit , p. 122. 
39 This may be shown mathematically: Suppose we have a system of difference 
equations of which the solution corresponds with a periodic movement. If 
add to anyone of these equations a trend term-i.e., the influence of some phe- 
nomenon, showing only secular movements-then only the trend of the resulting 
movement is different from the original movement Nothing changes In the period 
and damping degree of that  movement. 
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have been attracted by the investment-goods industries. According to 
this theory, an increase in savings is the only way of postponing the 
crisis. 
2. Two relations are of outstanding importance for the understand- 
ing of these problems, viz., that between savings and investment and 
that between the capacity to produce consumers' goods and the actual 
production of these goods. 
The first relation, that between savings and investments-where 
these words are used in the Robertsonian sense40-depends primarily on 
the elasticity of the credit supply. If that supply is fairly elastic-as we 
found it to  be as a rule-investments may easily surpass savings and a 
decrease in savings need not mean an equal decrease in investments. 
As a rule it will lead to a decrease in investments that is smaller than 
the clecrease in savings. Since the increase in consumption outlay to 
which a decrease in savings is equivalent equals that decrease in sav- 
ings, total outlay for consumers' goods and investment goods together 
will increase. And if a crisis would have come without that decrease in 
savings, it mill be postponed by that decrease. 
Three objections may be made: 
(i) If consumers7-goods industries are fully occupied, an increase in 
consumption outlay I\-ill not lead to a higher volume of production. If, 
a t  the same time, investment-goods industries are not fully occupicd, 
total volume of production will be increased by an increase in savings, 
even if total outlay goes down. 
Our answer is that as a rule the situation a t  the top of the boom is 
different. Investment-goods industries are occupied to a higher degree 
than consumers1-goods industries. By the way it may be observed that 
there is no evidence that, in the period preceding the turning point, 
workers are taken off from consumers'-goods industries to any appre- 
ciable extent as far as our knowledge of these matters goes. 
(ii) The second objection may be that if every increase in consump- 
tion outlay yields a higher national income, why not stop all saving 
and consume all? Our answer is that if the only object were to increase 
total outlay, this procedure would certainly work well. There are other 
consequences of it which are less preferable: i t  would lead to credit in- 
flation. The problem put by Haberler in order to clarify the controversy 
is, however, restricted: the only question being how a crisis may be 
postponed. This we think is actually obtained only by an increase in 
consumption outlay. In  other words, in this respect we adhere to the 
underconsumption theory. 
(iii) The third objection may be that a t  the very moment of the 
turning point the credit supply is completely inelastic and that this is 
the reason-in Hayek's theory-for thc breakdown to come. Our 
40 Cf. Haberler, op. cit., Ch. VIII, i n  particular p. 177. 
answer is that for some of the pre-1914 crises this seems actually to 
have been the case; but that even then total outlay would remain equal 
only if savings should suddenly decrease: even then the crisis would 
not be hastened by such a shift; and a postponement of it by an in- 
crease in savings is not probable. 
3. The second relation that deserves special attention with respect 
to the oversaving-undersaving controversy is that between the ca-
pacity to produce consumers' goods and the actual volume of produc- 
tion of these goods. Our results41 point to a very high elasticity of 
supply. Practically this means that demand determines the quantity 
produced. I t  follows that the volume of production need not necessarily 
increase if the capacity of production is increased. Theories ascribing 
the crisis to the sudden "pouring out of consumers' goods a t  the 
moment that the raw capital goods are completed"42 therefore do not 
seem to be realistic pictures of the events. They presuppose a low 
elasticity of supply. Moreover, they suggest that there would be one 
"moment" when new capital goods are completed in particularly large 
quantities. The increase in capacity is, for the economy as a whole, a 
very smooth process, however. 
In order to describe the relation here under discussion in other terms, 
we may say that the movements of total capacity available-however 
defined-are very slow, whereas those of the demand factors, such as 
incomes, are much more violent. For this reason, in connection with the 
high elasticity of supply, it is very improbable that changes in the 
capacity are the reasons for the fluctuations in volume of production, 
and very likely that the changes in demand explain them. In other 
words, it is not l'overproduction" that explains the crisis. 
The relation between the total of investment goods present a t  a 
certain moment and the possible output of consumers' goods is also 
influenced by the length of the roundabout way. With a longer round- 
about way, less consumers' goods will be yielded by the same quantity 
of investment goods than with a shorter roundabout way. As we have 
already pointed out, we do not think that the changes in the round- 
about way are very sensitive to changes in the interest rate, a t  least in 
the short run. Therefore we think that theories neglecting these changes 
will be more realistic than theories explaining the whole phenomenon 
of the cycle by it. We do not pretend, however, to have proved this 
statistically. 
4. For a good understanding of the questions under discussion it is 
useful also to repeat some remarks on the time order of events as we 
found them to exist roughly in the United Kingdom between 1870 and 
1914. The lag between investment-goods consumption and its deter- 
41 U.S.,Ch. 111;Holl., Section IC. 

42 Cf. IIaberler, op .  c i t . ,  p. 135. 
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minants is of the order of one year. I t  seems unrealistic then to ascribe 
the boom in investment-goods production chiefly to the low interest 
rates prevailing a t  the beginning of the boom. This would imply an 
average lag of some four years. Lags of four years may occur in some 
cases, but it is hard to believe that they are representative for the 
majority of investment acts. 
If this is so, and a shorter lag must hence be assumed to prevail, then 
a shortening of the roundabout way during the last two or three years 
of the boom would follow theoretically rather than a lengthening. 
Interest rates begin to rise shortly after the upturn. The duration of 
the upturn may on the average be taken a t  four to five years. One year 
after the interest rate begins to rise, its effect on investment has worked 
through. A rise in interest rates means a shortening of the roundabout 
way. There still remain two to three years of the boom before the 
turning point comes. During these years the roundabout way would 
be shortening rather than increasing. 
Further the shift towards more consumption and less saving towards 
the end of the boom, to which allusion is often made, does not seem to 
occur regularly.43 
5 .  In summary, our chief statements concerning the underconsump- 
tion theories are that :  (i) as long as there is some elasticity, however 
small, in the credit supply, any increase in consumption outlay will 
lead to an  increase in total outlay; only with a completely inelastic 
credit supply will total outlay remain unchanged; and that (ii) the 
supply of consumers' goods adapts itself to demand; hence, a turning 
point in production must be ascribed to a change in demand factors 
rather than in supply factors. These two statements may be given in 
the following short and therefore dangerous form: in the controversy 
between underconsumption and undersaving theory we adhere to the 
underconsumption theory; in the controversy between the undercon- 
sumption and the overproduction versions of that theory, we adhere 
to the underconsumption version. 
F. SUMMARY 
Let us now try to summarize our chief findings, negative as well as 
positive. 
Our chief negative results may be given under two headings: First, 
a n ~ ~mb e r  of theories seem to start from an erroneous factual basis. 
Examples are : 
(i) The assumption that there is a systematic lag between the cycles 
in the production of consumers' goods and investment goods. 
(ii) The assumption that there is a systematic shift towards the end 
of the boom, from investment to consumption. 
43 Cf. Section B, 6b, and Section C, 2. 
(iii) The assumption that the cyclic movements in investment-goods 
production may be explained by the acceleration principle. 
(iv) The assumption that fluctuations in the rate of interest have a 
considerable influence on the fluctuations in commodity stocks. 
We are also skeptical about the prominent place given in some 
theories to the rationing, in boom periods, of credits and to the opinion 
that the rate of interest would be determined by "deliberate action of 
the bankers." 
Secondly we have serious methodological objections against the 
methods of research used by some theorists: 
(i) We doubt whether the notions of roundabout way of production 
and of natural rate of interest are useful instruments of analysis. 
(ii) Too little attention is paid, as a rule, to the quantitative aspects 
of the explanation of cyclic movements. As we have set out already a t  
other opportunities there are numerous examples of theories that are 
indeterminate if not formulated quantitatively. The same qualitative 
mutual dependency of a system of variables leads to a cyclic movement 
for some sets of values of the coefficients and to a noncyclic movement 
for another set of values. 
(iii) Another criticism may be added to this list, vie., one concerning 
the well-known controversy whether more saving or more consumption 
will delay the outbreak of a crisis. We adhere to those who consider this 
controversy as nonessential. The essential issue is the choice between 
hoarding and spending rather than between saving and consuming. 
On the other hand, a number of elements of various theories have 
been found "confirmed" by our analysis. The reader should be re-
minded, however, that such confirmations are no proof of any theory. 
They only mean that the theories concerned are not contradictory to 
the facts. The following elements of different theories have been con- 
firmed in that restricted sense: 
(i) The chief elements of the "cumulative process": Increases in con- 
sumption outlay and investment activity lead to higher incomes. 
Higher incomes themselves lead to higher cons~rnp t ion ,~~  investment, 
and prices. An increase in prices yields a positive contribution to in- 
come calculations. 
(ii) Investment activity may be said to be regulated by the difference 
between profit rate and interest rate. The fluctuations in profit rate are 
more important than those in interest rates, however. 
(iii) The supply of money is found to be elastic in the United King- 
dom and fairly elastic in the United States, where an elasticity of 0.65 
was found. 
(iv) The supply of manufactured consumers' goods is found to be 
44 The notion of marginal propensity to  consume appears to  be particularly 
easy for the description of these interrelations. 
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very elastic; that of raw materials and that of investment goods in 
boom times is less elastic. This explains the well-known fact that prices 
of raw materials and investment goods rise in a greater proportion than 
prices of finished consumers' goods. 
(v) An element of minor importance is the dependency of money 
circulation on wage income. 
(vi) The result that the fluctuations in short-term interest rates de- 
pend to a large extent on the fluctuations in the gold stock of the 
central banks. 
Our positive findings have not all been discussed in the foregoing, 
since the primary object was to review given theories. In this summary 
we want, however, also to include such conclusions as do not bear on 
particular theories, in order to give an impression of our own view of 
the chief elements in an explanation of the cycle. 
(i) I t  is not necessary to explain the turning point by any sort of 
"saturation," by which we mean such phenomena as increasing in- 
elasticity (rationing), bottlenecks, and the like. 
(ii) The turning point may be explained by the combined action of 
some acceleration principle and one or more lags.46 By an acceleration 
principle we mean quite generally the influence of the rate of increase 
of any variable on that variable itself. 
(iii) As we have stated already, we reject the acceleration principle 
in the narrower sense, i.e., for the explanation of the production of 
durable investment goods. But there seems to be a considerable in- 
fluence of the rate of increase in raw-material prices or of the rate of 
increase in share prices on profit calculations and hence on general 
activity. This influence works in quite the same way, as far as the 
mathematical aspect is concerned, and may well explain the occurrence 
of cyclic movements without the help of "saturation" [cf. (i) above]. 
(iv) Some of the lags that play an important role in the explanation 
of short-run fluctuations are the lag between incomes and outlay and 
that brtween quantity demanded and prices. The first lag depends on 
technical elements in income formation (dividend payments, e.g.) and 
on a psychological lag in spending habits; the second is characteristic 
for the reactions of the producer to changes in his market: he will not 
immediately be able to discern fundamental changes from temporary 
ones and will therefore delay an adjustment of his price to a changed 
situation; moreoyer he will try to sell old stocks a t  old prices. 
Rotterdam School of Economics 
46 Of course a turning point may always he explained by an exogenous change. 
Professor Frisch has developed serlous arguments in favor of the statement that  
all turning points are to  be understood in this way. Cf. T. Haavelmo, "The 
Inadequacy of Testing Dynamic Theory . . . ," ECO~O~I~ETRICA,Vol. 8. October, 
1940. pp. 312-321. 
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